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Abstract 
 
In spite of previous common assumptions about the incompatibility of public key 
cryptography (PKC) schemes with wireless sensor networks (WSNs), recent works have 
shown that they can be utilized for such networks in some manner. The major challenge of 
employing a PKC-based scheme in a wireless sensor network is posed by the resource 
limitations of the tiny sensors. Considering this sensor feature, in this paper we propose an 
efficient PKC-based security architecture with relatively lower resource requirements than 
those of previously proposed PKC schemes for WSN. In addition, our scheme aims to provide 
robust security in the network. Our security architecture comprises two basic components; a 
key handshaking scheme based on simple, linear operations and the derivation of a decryption 
key by a receiver node. Our architecture enables node-to-base-station and node-to-node secure 
communications. Analysis and simulation results show that our proposed architecture ensures 
a good level of security for network communications, and can be effectively implemented with 
the limited computational, memory, and energy budgets of current-generation sensor nodes. 
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1. Introduction 
Security is an indispensable requirement for most sensor network applications. Though 
security is regarded as a standalone component of the architectures of many systems, in case of 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs), it must get adequate attention. The types of services 
expected in wireless sensor networks often require the network security architecture. In most 
application domains, the sensors are used to collect a specific type of data from particular 
target areas, and the collected data are often considered secret and are not intended for public 
disclosure. Hence, efficient and secure mechanisms are needed to transmit acquired data 
securely to the appropriate recipients. 
Wireless sensor networks occasionally carry confidential information, which, if exposed to 
enemy parties, might cause a debacle for friendly parties. Especially in military, medical, and 
emergency applications of WSN, employing apropos security mechanisms for data 
transmissions is crucial, as this data can be used to make tactical decisions. If an adversary 
thwarts the operation of the network by modifying the transmitted information, stopping 
transmission, or by eavesdropping on information, then the usefulness of sensor networks is 
drastically curtailed. Likewise, for example in a disaster management related application, 
accurate and unmodified data is needed to predict upcoming disaster(s) and provide advanced 
warning to concerned parties about event(s).  
However, ensuring a good level of security for such types of networks is not a trivial task. 
As WSNs use wireless communications, the threats and attacks against them are more diverse 
and often large-scale. It is not possible to deal with all types of security threats with a single 
mechanism. Rather, a combination of different security schemes for a single network could be 
the solution. For example, an attack at the physical layer such as jamming [1] cannot be 
handled by any key management scheme. Hence, several mechanisms at different layers can 
be employed simultaneously, to provide holistic security [2] for wireless sensor networks and 
in addition the level of security in the data transmission and communication phase can be 
increased via efficient key management schemes. Public key cryptography (PKC) can be the 
best choice for ensuring a satisfactory level of security for data transmissions in the network. 
However, the major challenge of employing any public key-based security scheme in WSN is 
the constrained energy, computational, and memory budgets of sensors participating in the 
network. Because of this fact, PKC-based schemes were not utilized in these networks for 
quite some time. 
To counter the bias against PKC for WSNs, several public key schemes have recently 
demonstrated an acceptable performance for low-power sensor nodes [3] [4] [5]. Considering 
both the software and hardware configurations, elliptical curve-based public key cryptography 
(ECPKC) has shown relatively better results for eight-bit mote platforms. However, the use of 
certificates in such a scheme consumes substantial bandwidth and power.  
Considering the special characteristics of wireless sensor networks, in this paper we propose 
an efficient public key based security architecture for WSNs. Before presenting our proposal, 
we analyze related studies and their benefits and drawbacks, to provide readers with a clear 
picture of the current status of PKC-related research works in wireless sensor networks. Many 
recent works have suggested the feasibility of PKC in WSNs, with little energy cost. This 
could be   especially helpful in applications that require a high level of security. Inspired by the 
encouraging results of practical implementations, we propose a security architecture that can 
exploit the benefits of PKC in WSNs. In our scheme, we use a pseudo-inverse matrix for the 
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first component, while the second component is a simple method for passing the decryption 
key to the receiver node [6]. Our analysis and simulation results show that our scheme 
demonstrates a considerable gain in the level of security, and is suitable for current generation 
sensor nodes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 presents the literature review and 
motivation for our work, Section 3 states the preliminaries and assumptions for our security 
architecture. Section 4 presents our proposed architecture and schemes. Section 5 deals with 
the performance analysis and simulation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper, stating 
the contributions of this work and future research directions. 
2. Literature Review and Motivation 
Most works about public key cryptography in wireless sensor networks are based on the 
low-power characteristics of sensor nodes. Several recent works have successfully 
implemented public key schemes with current-generation sensors. In terms of both software 
and hardware perspectives, PKC schemes have shown reasonable performance. In this section, 
we discuss some of these exclusive research works and their comparative features. 
[3] presented the first known implementation of elliptic curve cryptography over F2p for 
sensor networks based on eight-bit, 7.3828 MHz MICA2 motes  [7]. The results show that a 
public key based scheme is feasible for current-generation sensors. The TinyPK system 
demonstrated in [8] shows that a public-key based protocol is feasible, even for an extremely 
lightweight sensor network. TinyPK is a software-based implementation of a public key 
system tested on UC Berkeley MICA2 motes. 
Gaubatz et al. [9] proposed a custom hardware-assisted approach which makes public key 
cryptography feasible in WSN environments, provided that suitable algorithms and associated 
parameters, careful optimization, and low-power design techniques are selected. In order to 
validate their claim, they present proof of concept implementations of two different algorithms; 
Rabin’s Scheme and NtruEncrypt. Their work demonstrates that in spite of common 
assumptions about public key cryptography, it is possible to achieve a level of power 
consumption that is sufficiently low to enable its use even for battery-attached sensor nodes. 
In [10] it was shown that special purpose, ultra-low power hardware implementations of 
public key algorithms can be used for sensor nodes. The authors show that PKC tremendously 
simplifies the implementation of many typical security services and reduces transmission 
power, because of a lower protocol overhead. Also, [10] provides an in-depth comparison of 
three different PKC implementations (Rabin’s scheme, NtruEncrypt, and Elliptic Curve) 
particularly aimed at wireless sensor networks. 
Blaß and Zitterbart [11] presented an efficient and lightweight implementation of 
public-key cryptography algorithms relying on elliptic curves. They checked their codes by 
implementing them on popular eight-bit ATMEGA128 microcontroller, the heart of the 
MICA2 platform. Their work concluded that public-key cryptography is feasible for sensor 
networks. 
Gupta et al. [12] showed that elliptic curve cryptography not only makes public-key 
cryptography feasible for these devices, but also enables the creation of a complete, secure 
web server stack that runs efficiently with very stringent resource constraints. Their work, viz., 
Sizzle, is the first time the Internet’s dominant security protocol (SSL) has been applied to 
devices with significant computational, memory, and energy constraints. It uses highly 
optimized implementations of public-key cryptography to support scalable key management 
and end-to-end security, without sacrificing efficiency. 
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In [4], the authors conducted a comparative energy analysis of RSA and ECC based public 
key algorithms for wireless sensor networks. They use a simplified version of SSL for mutual 
authentication and key exchange. For their experiments, they use the Berkley/Crossbow motes 
platform, specifically MICA2DOT. Based on the results of their experiments, it is clear that 
contrary to common assumptions, authentication and key exchange protocols using optimized 
software implementations of public key cryptography are feasible for small, wireless devices. 
Murphy et al. [13] showed that it is possible to implement public key algorithms for 
resource constrained sensor node platforms. Via a hardware/software co-design approach, 
they successfully map a public key cryptosystem based on Rabin's scheme to the motes 
developed by Tyndall National Institute. Their implementation focuses on efficient 
architectures that execute public key algorithms using minimal resources. Their finding is that 
the hardware implementation of the encryption algorithm is much faster than the software 
implementation. Software implementations of the algorithm are also realizable, and provide 
the benefits of low cost and high flexibility. However the time necessary to perform 
encryption/decryption is significantly increased if a software-only approach is used.  
Piotrowski et al. [14] investigated four types of nodes; MICA2DOT, MICA2, MICAz, and 
TelosB, and estimated the power consumption for most common RSA and ECC operations. 
Their work gives an indication of how public key cryptography influences a wireless node’s 
lifetime. In [5], the authors propose C4W, which is basically an identity-based PKC 
infrastructure. They show that their identity-based scheme consumes less energy, as it is 
certificate-less, and thus it is efficient, both in terms of computational and communication 
costs. 
A hardware implementation of PKC for elliptic curves over binary extension fields was 
proposed in [15]. In this paper, the authors proposed a dedicated coprocessor for certain 
cryptographic operations. They showed that a reasonable amount of power savings can be 
achieved in this case, and thus improved performance can be achieved, without degrading 
other performance parameters. Though the actual data path is only eight bits, this special 
purpose coprocessor can handle operands of even 163 bits. 
A distributed, cooperative public key authentication scheme is proposed in [16]. It is also a 
hash key based scheme. In this cooperative mechanism, each node stores a limited number of 
hashed keys for other nodes, which help in authentication during public key operation. 
According to [16], this scheme avoids cryptographic operations, and is designed for the 
constrained resources of the sensors. However the major drawback of the proposed method is 
that it is only designed for one-hop authentication, which makes it impractical and inefficient 
for conventional multi-hop WSNs. 
In [17] there was an examination of several additive homomorphic public key encryption 
schemes and their applicability to WSNs, when implemented on computationally limited 
sensor devices. The authors in this work provide recommendations for selecting the most 
suitable public key schemes based on topologies and scenarios for wireless sensor networks. 
In their works, Roman and Alcaraz [18] discussed the applicability of public key 
infrastructures to wireless sensor networks and Ugus et al. [19] implement elliptic curve and 
finite field arithmetic operations on a MICAz mote, which is a typical device employed in 
wireless sensor networks. 
Other than the aforementioned works, in [20], Du et al. suggest limited use of PKC, due to 
its high power consumption characteristics, and propose the use of a one-way hash function 
instead of a certificate. Construction of a Merkle tree forest from sensors’ public keys and 
selection of the height of the tree are the basics of their scheme. They compare their scheme 
with other popular PK (public key) schemes for sensor networks, and plot the results, which 
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 2, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2008                              269 
show significant gains. However, the drawback of this scheme is that it requires storing some 
information in the sensors’ memory, prior to their deployment. 
After reviewing these works, we were motivated to propose a public key based architecture 
for secure wireless sensor networks. We consider the resource limitations of the sensors and 
propose an approach that demonstrates good performance with current generation sensor node 
platforms. We first derive the shared secret key for node-to-base station communications and 
then exploit the asymmetric nature of PK schemes for node-to-node secure communications. 
The following section describes our security architecture in detail. 
3. Network Assumptions and Preliminaries 
We assume that the base station (BS) has sufficient processing power and energy to perform 
the calculations for the sensors in the network. The base station is a trusted entity, and cannot 
be compromised by any means. The BS also has sufficient storage capacity to support the 
network. The sensors deployed in the network have computational, memory, communication, 
and energy resources similar to current-generation sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 motes). Once 
the sensors are deployed over the target area, they remain relatively static in their respective 
positions. 
3.1 Pseudo-inverse Matrix 
The pseudoinverse matrix or generalised inverse matrix [21] [22] has an elegant property that 
can be exploited for cryptographic operations. It is well known that a nonsingular matrix over 
any field has a unique inverse. For a general matrix of dimension nk × , there might exist 
more than one generalized inverse. This is denoted by, =),( nkM {A: A is a nk ×  matrix}. 
Let ),( nkMA∈ . If there exists a matrix ),( knMB∈  such that; 
AABA =  and BBAB =  
then A and B are both called a generalized inverse matrix (or pseudo-inverse matrix) of the 
other. In this paper, we use the notation gA  to denote the generalized inverse matrix of A. We 
use pseudo-inverse matrix for the key handshaking in our security architecture. 
It should be noted that, AA gg =)( is not always true. The set of all possible pseudo-inverse 
matrices of A is denoted by }{ gA  and |}{| gA is the cardinality of }{ gA . Then we have: 
Lemma 1: Let gA be a pseudo-inverse matrix of A . Then; 
                                                           )()( ArankArank g =  
Lemma 2: Let ),( nkMA∈ with kArank =)( . If A can be written as ]0;[ 1AA = , where 
1A is a kk × nonsingular matrix then, ),(:{}{
1
1 kknMZ
Z
A
Ag −∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
−
 is an arbitrary matrix}  
Proof: Let ),( knM
Z
X
B ∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= . Then, it is easy to verify that both AABA = and 
BBAB = are true, if and only if 11−= AX . 
3.2 Our PKC-Based Security Architecture 
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In this section, we present our public key based security architecture with two separate but 
interrelated components. The first component is key handshaking, in which each network node 
can derive a shared secret key with the base station, and the second component is used for 
confidential and authenticated data transmissions between two participating network nodes. 
3.3 Key Handshaking between a Node and Base Station 
Let in be a network node and S  be the base station or sink. To derive a shared secret key 
between the node in  and the base station, the following operations are performed: 
1. Node in  randomly generates a matrix X with dimension nm× and its psedo-inverse 
matrix, gX . These matrices are kept secret in the node. 
2. 2. in  calculates XX g and sends it to the base station S . 
3. In turn, S  randomly generates another matrix Y with dimension kn× , and determines 
its pseudo-inverse matrix gY . These matrices are also kept secret in the base station. 
4. 4. S calculates XYX g  and gg XYYX . Then, it sends the resultant matrices to in . 
5. After receiving the products of matrices from S , in  calculates, ggg XYYXYYXX = and 
sends it back to the base station. 
6. Here, both the node in  and base station S  can compute the secret shared key; in   
calculates XYXYXX g =)(  and the base station calculates XYYXYYg =)( . Both 
these outcomes (XY) are the same matrix with dimension km× . 
 
Fig. 1.  Key handshaking between a sensor and base station, to derive a shared secret key 
Fig. 1 shows the communications between a sensor and the base station in key handshaking. 
Basically, the key is locally computed by the node and the base station. Our mechanism 
ensures that the individually calculated keys are the same, and this common key is used for 
encrypting the network messages. Thus, key handshaking ensures a secure and efficient means 
of deriving unique secret keys (shared with the base station) for each node participating in the 
wireless sensor network. The derived shared key can be used for node-to-base station or base 
station-to-node secure communications. 
3.4 Encryption/Decryption of Data for Node-to-Node Communications 
The main module in secure node-to-node communications is the central key generator (CKG),   
which is located at the base station. CKG helps any network node to decrypt the received 
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encrypted messages from other nodes. If a node in  wants to send a secure message to another  
node jn , it uses the key derived via key handshaking. For example, assume that the encrypted 
message sent from in  to jn  is )(MEXY . Here, M is the message sent from the sender to 
receiver. XYE  means the message is encrypted with the key XY , which is actually the shared 
secret key between the base station and sender in . After receiving the encrypted message, jn  
sends its own identity and the identity of the sender to the CKG. In turn, CKG generates a 
decryption key and transmits it to jn  encrypting it with the secret shared key that it has with 
jn . As the CKG in the base station has prior knowledge about the shared secret keys of both  
nodes, it uses that knowledge to generate the decryption key. Here, jn  first decrypts the 
encrypted message (i.e., containing the corresponding decryption key) with its shared key, 
determines the decryption key and uses that key to decrypt the message sent from node in . 
 
Fig. 2.  Encryption/decryption of message by two communicating network nodes 
Fig. 2 shows the secure communication method between two network nodes. In the figure, 
XAYA is the shared secret key between ni and the base station, XBYB is the shared secret key 
between nj and the base station, M is the message that is encrypted by ni, and Kd is the 
decryption key provided by the base station. 
4. Performance Evaluation and Comparison 
To analyze the performance of our security scheme, we considered the specifications of the 
MICA2DOT [7] mote platform. We analyzed the PKC-based architecture in terms of the 
energy cost, memory cost, computational cost, security, and scalability. In this section, we 
discuss the detailed analysis and simulation results for our approach. 
In key handshaking, we used linear matrix operations, matrix multiplication to be precise. 
The complexity of matrix multiplication is very low; hence it can be performed very quickly. 
In our shared secret key derivation scheme, node in  sends the base station an nn× matrix, 
which consists of 2n  bits. In turn, the base station sends an kn× matrix and an nn× matrix. 
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For this, the total number of bits used for the matrices is: )(2 knnnkn +=+ . Again, the 
node in  sends the base station nm×  bits. So, the total number of bits used for the matrices 
transmitted, to derive the shared key in overall key handshaking  is; 
                                                      mnknnn +++ )(2  
                                                       )( mknnn +++=  
                                                       )2( mknn ++=  bits 
All these computations are linear and can be performed very easily. 
In the first component, for key handshaking we use the public channel for the message 
transmission. However, capturing the messages such as XX g , XYX g , gg XYYX and 
gXYY  may not be helpful for constructing the locally computed secret shared key XY . It 
might seem that a prospective attack can gain some information about matrix Y from 
knowledge about XX g  and XYX g . Let us consider, rXrank =)( . Let us assume that; 
                                                              ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
00
0r
g
I
XX  
Here, rI  is an identity matrix of order rr × . Then, only the first r rows of Y can be 
determined from XYX g . As Y  is chosen randomly, there are 
krn ⋅− )(2  ways to choose the last 
)( rn −  rows of Y . The knowledge about gg XYYX  might be helpful for determining Y  but 
according to Lemma 2 it is of little use to the adversary. Without knowledge about the last 
)( rn −  rows of Y , even if X is completely known, the probability of determining the correct 
value of each element of XY would be 
2
1
, considering that any row vector of X has a 
nonzero element in any of the last )( rn −  positions, which is likely when )( rn −  is very 
large and X is chosen at random. However, the probability of determining X from 
knowledge about gg XYYX and gXYY  is even smaller where 
)()( AArankABBArank ggg ≤ . So, based on this analysis of the key handshaking phase, it 
can be assumed that, the probability of successful cracking of this scheme is, krn ⋅−− )(2 . So, the 
security of the handshaking scheme is reasonably high for carefully chosen parameters. To 
ensure that krn ⋅− )(2  is a large number, n  must be considerably larger than r . And this can be 
guaranteed by ensuring that nm < . 
There are vulnerabilities in key handshaking between a node and the base station, if there is 
sort of identification problem with the participating entities during communications. In our 
scheme however, this threat has been completely eliminated because; (a) The base station is a 
trusted entity and cannot be compromised by any means and (b) The IDs of the 
communicating nodes are checked by the base station before further communications. In the 
second component of node-to-node communication, when the receiver node requests the 
corresponding decryption key, the key is not sent as a plaintext, rather it is encrypted with the 
shared secret key of the receiver. So, there is no way any adversary can determine the 
decryption keys for a particular sender-receiver pair. 
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Fig. 3.  Key sizes, required to ensure similar levels of security in our key handshaking scheme and the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. It is evident that our handshaking scheme requires a much 
smaller size key for each of the cases plotted in this figure 
 
Here, let us compare our shared key derivation scheme with Diffie-Hellman’s scheme [23]. 
In the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme, a primitive element α over a finite field 
)( pGF is used. The first user randomly chooses an integer x  from )( pGF  and sends 
px modα to the second user. In turn, the second user chooses an integer y and sends 
py modα to the first user. Both users can derive a shared secret key pxy modα  which is 
p2log bits in length. And p2log2 bits of data are transmitted via the public channel in this 
key exchange. 
The security of the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) scheme is based on the difficulty of a discrete 
logarithm problem, such that given xα and yα over the finite field )( pGF , the problem is 
how to determine xyα . If x can be determined from xα , which is actually a discrete 
logarithm problem, then xyxy )(αα =  can be determined. The average computational 
complexity of this discrete logarithm problem using the best method known to date [24] is 
)))log(log)))(log1(923.1(exp(( 3
2
22
3
1
2 ppoO +  bit operations. 
Based on the aforementioned analysis, we found that to achieve a security level 
(complexity) of 3.492 in the D-H scheme, a key size of 200 bits is needed. On the other hand, to 
achieve a similar level of security (1/probability) of 482 , a 48-bit key is required in our 
scheme. Likewise, to achieve security of 3.592 , 4.672 and 4.742 in the D-H scheme, 300, 400 
and 500 bit keys are required, respectively. On the other hand, to achieve security of 602 , 
702 and 752 in our approach, 75, 84 and 105 bit keys are required, respectively. In this analysis, 
the sizes of p in bits for the D-H scheme are 200, 300, 400 and 500, respectively. For our 
approach, ),,( knm is (4, 8, 12), (5, 9, 15), (6, 11, 14) and (7, 12, 15) respectively. Fig. 3 
shows the level of security achieved with the key sizes in our approach and the D-H scheme. It 
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is clear from the figure that in all cases, our approach needs keys with a much smaller size than 
that of the D-H scheme. In the figure, the x-axis shows the values of the exponent of 2  to plot 
the security level for various key sizes. For example, a value of 48 along the x-axis 
corresponds to 482 . This is in order to fit the values in the graph for visual representation. 
The volume of traffic carrying the key-related information is also dependent on the size of 
the key. Fig. 4 plots the key sizes in bits versus the volume of traffic (considering only the 
key-related information) that pass through the open public channel in our overall security 
architecture and the Diffie-Hellman scheme. The data in this figure is based on the fact that the 
same level (or a similar level) of security is required for both schemes. From the figure, note 
that in our approach the key sizes and volume of key-related traffic are relatively smaller than 
those of the Diffie-Hellman scheme. For example, whereas the size of the key in bits is only 48 
in our scheme, the Diffie-Hellman scheme requires a 200-bit key to provide the same level of 
security. So, the volume of key-related traffic is much higher in their scheme than that of our 
scheme. Considering this case, the volume of traffic in our scheme is 304 bits, while in the 
case of the Diffie-Hellman scheme, it is 400 bits. As the key size increases, the difference in 
the volume of key-related traffic between these schemes also increases. 
Here, as Diffie-Hellman scheme is based on discrete logarithm problem, the eavesdropper’s 
computational capability is considered when the security is analyzed. However, our first 
component is not a discrete logarithm problem rather it is a probabilistic problem, to crack the 
scheme. Hence, the increase of the computational capability of the eavesdropper or the 
man-in-the-middle adversary does not affect the probability of cracking the scheme. 
In the second phase of our architecture, only two messages are transmitted over the public 
channel. When the receiver node needs the decryption key to decrypt a message from a 
particular sender node, it sends a request to the base station for the corresponding decryption 
key. In return, the base station encrypts the decryption key with the shared secret key of the 
receiver node. As the shared secret key is not known to any other network node, the decryption 
key for that particular sender-receiver pair cannot be exposed. Here, there is a problem if the 
shared secret key of a network node is somehow compromised. In such a case, the base station 
revokes the shared key and key handshaking is re-initiated for that particular node. If such a 
compromise occurs, even in that case, only one network node is affected, while all other nodes 
can continue to operate and transmit their messages. 
As any node can obtain a corresponding decryption key from the base station for any sender 
network node, any pair of network nodes can communicate between themselves, maintaining 
the high level of security. As mentioned earlier, for base station-to-node communications or 
node-to-base station communications, the shared secret key derived from handshaking is used, 
which requires very little computation and message transmission. 
In our simulation, we considered the specifications of Berkeley/Crossbow MICA2DOT 
motes [7]. These motes are equipped with eight-bit ATmega128L microcontrollers with a four 
MHz clock speed, 128 kB program memory and Chipcon CC1000 low-power wireless 
transceiver with a 433-916 MHz frequency band. The major power consumers in this mote are 
the processor and wireless transceiver. During the transmission and reception operations, the 
microcontroller is turned on along with the wireless transceiver. According to our calculations, 
the cost of transmission of one byte is 59.2 μJ, while the reception operation has about half the 
transmission cost (28.6 μJ). The power to transmit one bit is equivalent to roughly 2,090 clock 
cycles of execution of the microcontroller. In our simulation, we considered a packet size of 41 
bytes (payload of 32 bytes, header 9 bytes). With an eight byte preamble (source and 
destination address, packet length, packet ID, CRC and a control byte) for each packet, we 
found that to transmit one packet 49×  59.2 = 2.9008 mJ ≈ 2.9 mJ energy is required. 
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Accordingly, the energy cost for receiving the same packet is 49×  28.6 = 1.4014 mJ ≈ 1.4 mJ. 
Considering the same packet size for all network operations, to set up a shared secret key with 
the base station, each node needs (two transmissions and one reception) ((2×2.9)+1.4) = 7.2 
mJ of energy. This cost is a one-time cost, as once the shared secret key is derived it can be 
used for the entire lifetime of the network, unless the key is exposed. For node-to-node 
communication, the sender needs one transmission (2.9 mJ), and the receiver needs two 
receptions and one transmission (((2×1.4)+2.9) = 5.7 mJ). Overall, the entire scheme is within 
the energy resource budget of current-generation sensor nodes. 
 
Fig. 4.  Key size versus volume of traffic to carry the key-related information through the public channel 
in our approach (overall) and in the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) scheme, to ensure similar levels of security 
 
Table 1. Communication Costs for Our Scheme and Other PKC-Based Schemes 
Communication Cost 
PKC-based Schemes Sender (ni) [mJ] Receiver (nj) [mJ] 
C4W 6.3 4.8 
Our Scheme 10.1 5.7 
SSSL 19.4 19.6 
We compare our scheme with C4W [5] and the one proposed in [4], which uses a simplified 
version of the SSL handshake. Considering the energy consumption for communications, our 
scheme lies mid-way between the other two schemes (shown in Table 1). To support our 
security architecture, for sender node (ni), the number of transmissions and receptions is three 
and one, respectively, which consumes ((3×2.9) +1.4) = 10.1 mJ) of energy in total. In the 
case of the receiver node (nB), it is 5.7 mJ for one transmission and two receptions. Fig. 5 
shows a comparative graph of the communication costs for these schemes. 
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Fig. 5.  Communication costs comparing PKC-based schemes 
Though considering the communication cost, C4W exhibits better performance than our 
scheme and SSSL, it requires pre-storage of all parameters before its deployment. This causes 
additional memory requirements, which is not present in our scheme. So, in terms of memory 
requirements our asymmetric key-based scheme is better, and its communication cost is 
satisfactory. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that our approach is highly scalable, as any number of new 
sensors can be added to an existing wireless sensor network, based on the requirements. Any 
newly added node can exchange a shared secret key with the base station via key handshaking, 
and then it can be used for node-to-node secure communications. 
6. Conclusions and Future Works 
Use of PKC or PKC-based schemes in WSNs is no longer a fiction. We have shown that many 
researchers are aiming to find the means to optimize PKC-based schemes. To facilitate the 
development of holistic security architecture for wireless sensor networks, in this paper we 
have presented an efficient approach, which exploits the asymmetry of a public key 
cryptosystem for secure network communications. We have used different keys for 
encryption/decryption of messages for node-to-node communications. Our simulation results 
and analysis have shown a considerable level of security that is feasible with 
current-generation sensor node platforms. As the keys are generated after deployment of the 
sensors, no pre-assignment of keys is required,   and in our approach there is no need to store a 
look-up key table. Our PKC-based architecture does not require any centralized certificate 
authority and thus it avoids the need of managing and verifying huge number of 
communications associated with certificates. In the future, we will combine our work with 
other security mechanisms associated with different operation layers, to construct a holistic 
security architecture for wireless sensor networks. 
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